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CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 38 SPRING 2002 NUMBER 2
LEARNING FROM OUR MISTAKES: A CRIMINAL JUSTICE
COMMISSION TO STUDY WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
KEITH A. FINDLEY*
INTRODUCTION
For hundreds of years the criminal justice system has developed, relied
upon, and incrementally refined a body of rules and procedures ostensibly
designed to ensure that at the end of the day, the guilty are convicted and the
innocent are acquitted. The rules have developed through custom and com-
mon law, and then through legislation and formal rule-making, through a
process of trial and error and logical argument about what might be effective
in ascertaining the truth. The criminal justice system has developed largely
through faith in the adversarial process, faith in the rules of evidence, faith in
the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and faith in the common
sense of police, lawyers, judges, and politicians to create an effective truth-
finding process. Recent empirical evidence, however, especially DNA evi-
dence, has opened a window through which we can examine this faith in the
system. That window both reveals the errors in the system and suggests
means to remedy them.
Rarely has the system relied upon real study to determine what actually
produces fair and accurate results. Sporadically, courts have relied upon em-
pirical evidence from the social or psychological sciences. Just as frequently,
however, courts have created rules or followed procedures that ignore or
even contradict what the empirical evidence shows. The psychological litera-
ture, for example, is replete with studies showing that, in the area of eyewit-
ness identification, the confidence of a witness bears almost no relation to
* Clinical Associate Professor; Co-Director, Wisconsin Innocence Project, University of Wis-
consin Law School. J.D., Yale Law School, 1985.
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the likely accuracy of the identification.' Yet in the established constitutional
law governing admissibility of eyewitness identifications, a witness's confi-
dence is one of the factors the Supreme Court has said courts must consider
in determining whether an eyewitness identification obtained through a sug-
gestive procedure is nonetheless sufficiently reliable to be admissible.' Simi-
larly, hard evidence shows that jurors do not understand the psychological
processes at work in an eyewitness identification and tend to rely an unwar-
ranted extent on such identifications, 3 and that expert testimony can help cor-
rect such juror misunderstandings Nonetheless, courts in many jurisdictions
routinely continue to exclude expert testimony designed to educate jurors on
these matters, often on the ground that such information is within the com-
mon knowledge of jurors or would usurp the role of the jury.'
Part of the reason why the judicial system relies so infrequently on real
study of what works and what doesn't is that it is so very hard to know
which outcomes are accurate and which are not. The jury verdict is our al-
most sacred test for whether one is guilty or innocent. With the jury verdict
itself as the end-all measure of guilt or innocence, there is no ready mecha-
nism for determining whether the jury verdict in any given case is itself a re-
flection of truth or a terrible mistake.' And the guilty or no contest plea,
I. See, e.g., Steven Penrod & Brian Cutler, Witness Confidence and Witness Accuracy:
Assessing Their Forensic Relation, I PSYCH. PUB. POL. & LAW 817, 825 (1995) (marshalling
numerous studies and concluding that "under the conditions that typically prevail in short
criminal encounters.., witness confidence... is largely unrelated to accuracy, and confi-
dence in having made a correct identification is, at best, only modestly associated with identi-
fication accuracy").
2. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972); Manson v. Brathwaitc, 432 U.S.
98, 114 (1977). Indeed, research has shown that the factors these cases mandate to evaluate
the reliability of a suggestive eyewitness identification procedure-including a witness's per-
ception of her opportunity to observe the suspect and the confidence with which she makes
her identification-are themselves affected by the suggestiveness of the lineup procedure. Be-
cause they are so affected by suggestiveness, they provide a poor basis upon which to evalu-
ate whether an identification is sufficiently reliable to overcome that very suggestiveness. See
Gary L. Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness Identification: Psychological Research and Legal
Policy on Lineups, 1 PSYCH. PUB. POL. & LAW 765, 785 (1995).
3. See ELIZABETH LoFrus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 171-77 (1979); ELIZABETH LoFrus
& KATHERINE KETCHAM, WITNESS FOR THE DEFENSE: THE ACCUSED, THE EYEWITNESS, AND
THE EXPERT WHO PUTS MEMORY ON TRIAL 14-30 (1991); Cindy J. O'Hagan, Note: When See-
ing Is Not Believing: The Case for Eyewitness Expert Testimony, 81 GEO. L.J. 741, 747-5 I
(1993).
4. See Harmon M. Hosch et al., Influence of Expert Testimony Regarding Eyewitness Ac-
curacy on Jury Decisions, 4 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 287, 294 (1980).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1104-07 (7th Cir. 1999); United States
v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148,
1153 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Purham, 725 F.2d 450, 454 (8th Cir. 1984); State v.
Butterfield, 27 P.3d 1133, 1146 (Utah 2001); O'Hagan, supra note 3, at 757-62.
6. See Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Relia-
bly Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1322 (1997) ("[While any serious
evaluation of the quality of criminal justice rendered requires an inquiry into whether the in-
nocent are convicted, an explicit answer cannot be found in the results of the adjudicatory
process itself.").
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which accounts for a far greater percentage of criminal convictions than jury
verdicts,7 is even more intuitively understood to be the measure of truth, and
accordingly even less susceptible to evaluation for the possibility that an in-
nocent person might have pled guilty.' Without an external measuring stick,
there has been no real way to gauge the accuracy of guilt and innocence de-
terminations. That is, until recently.
I. THE OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN
In recent years a body of cases has developed in which we know that the
verdict (or in some cases the guilty plea) was wrong. Especially with the ad-
vent of postconviction DNA testing, but also in non-DNA cases, we now
have a body of cases in which we know that an injustice was done, that an
innocent person was convicted and often sent to prison for many years or to
death row.
For years scholars have sought to identify wrongful convictions." Ed-
ward Borchard, in his classic work in 1932, identified sixty-five wrongful
convictions."0 Judge Jerome Frank and his daughter, Barbara, followed in
1957 with an analysis of another set of wrongly convicted individuals."
More recently, Hugo Bedeau and Michael Radelet in 1987 identified 350
wrongful convictions in cases potentially subject to capital punishment." In
1992, joined by Constance Putnam, Bedeau and Radelet expanded their
work to include over 400 such cases in the twentieth century." False confes-
sion scholars Richard Leo and Richard Ofshe have identified another sixty
7. Over ninety percent of convictions in the United States are the product of a guilty or
no contest plea. See id. at 1337.
8. Intuitively, it is hard to imagine that anyone would plead guilty or no contest to a
crime he or she did not commit. This intuitive assessment, however, like the jury verdict it-
self, is not uniformly true. The spate of recent exonerations based on postconviction DNA
testing includes cases in which the defendant pled guilty to a crime he did not commit. See,
e.g., EDwARD CONNORS ET AL, CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY Sct-NcE.: CASE
STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL 12 (Dep't Jus-
tice, National Institute of Justice 1996) (reporting that David Vasquez pled guilty in Virginia
to a crime DNA later proved he did not commit); Keith A. Findley & John Pray, Lessons from
the Innocent, 47 WiS. ACADEMY REV. 33, 34 (Fall 2001) (describing the case of Christopher
Ochoa, who pled guilty in Texas to a rape and murder that DNA later proved he did not
commit).
9. For a good summary of the scholarly works identifying wrongful convictions, see
Adele Berhard, When Justice Fails: Indemnification for Unjust Conviction, 6 U. CHI. L. ScH.
ROUNDTABLE 73, 75-80 (1999).
10. EDwARD M. BORCHARD, CONvICTING THE INNOCENT: SIxTY-FIvE ACTUAL ERRORS OF
C.mIWAL JusnCE (1932).
11. JERoME FRANK & BARBARA FRANK, NOT GUILTY (1957).
12. Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriage of Justice in Potentially
Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987).
13. MICHAEL L. RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE: ERRONEOUS CONVICTIONS IN
CAPrrAL CASES (1992).
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modem-era cases of police-induced false confessions."' The work of these
scholars has made an important contribution to the study and critique of the
criminal justice system. But the underlying premise-that the cases identi-
fied are cases of wrongful conviction of the innocent-has not gone unchal-
lenged. 5 And even where error is undisputed, the errors have typically been
dismissed as anomalies rather than symptoms of systemic flaws. 6 Without
scientific proof of error, these cases have lacked the certainty necessary for
undisputed and objective study of the failings of the criminal justice system.
That has changed with the emergence of DNA typing as a forensic tool.
After an uncertain start in the late 1980s and early 1990s, DNA typing has
matured into a scientific arbiter of truth, whose reliability and validity is now
beyond dispute.'" Most significantly for purposes of this article, DNA typing
has been used in the postconviction context during the past dozen years to
exonerate more than one hundred wrongly convicted individuals in the
United States. 8 In most of these cases, the DNA evidence proved beyond
any doubt that the convicted person could not have perpetrated the crime.
These cases have not only confirmed that wrongful convictions exist, and at
a higher rate than ever acknowledged previously, but have shown that inno-
cent people are often convicted in cases where innocence is least suspected.
Unlike the notorious cases of wrongful conviction studied previously, many
of the DNA exonerations occurred in cases that otherwise looked airtight. 9
Without the DNA, many never would have been noticed.
Additionally, an identifiable and alarming body of wrongful conviction
cases has emerged in the death penalty context. Since 1973, one hundred
14. Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Depri-
vations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J.
CRIM. L. & CRWINOLOGY 429 (1998).
15. See, e.g., Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A Re-
sponse to the Bedeau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REv. 121 (1988) (challenging Bedeau &
Radelet's innocence assessments); Paul G. Cassell, The Guilty and the "Innocent": An Ex-
amination of Alleged Cases of Wrongful Conviction from False Confessions, 22 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 523 (1999) (challenging Leo & Ofshe's innocence assessments); Givelber, supra
note 6, at 1323 ("Because a claim of actual innocence requires a judgment which goes beyond
that which official governmental bodies make, such claims are often disputed.").
16. See Givelber, supra note 6, at 1325 (because false convictions are largely hidden in
the criminal justice system, they are viewed as "random events of popular interest, not a sub-
ject deserving systematic attention").
17. This is not to suggest that DNA evidence is always dispositive on the question of
guilt or innocence. The value of DNA evidence depends on the quality of the testing results,
and also on the significance of the biological evidence in the overall evidentiary picture in a
given case. In some cases, biological evidence is relatively insignificant, such as where a sus-
pect's biological evidence could be found at a crime scene for perfectly innocent reasons. In
other cases, however, the DNA results-for example, the DNA profiles from a rape kit in-
volving a single-perpetrator rape-can be virtually conclusive.
18. For an updated tally of DNA exonerations, see The Innocence Projcct, at
http://www.innocenceproject.org/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2002).
19. See Givelber, supra note 6, at 1347.
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people have been exonerated and released from death row.' These are not
just cases in which the claim of innocence rests upon the post hoc judgment
of an academic. These are cases in which the government has officially
judged the convictions or death sentences to be erroneous, through reversal,
dismissal, or pardon. Twelve of the wrongly condemned men and women
were exonerated by DNA evidence.' In some of the non-DNA cases, the
proof of innocence was strong, but lacked the scientific certainty of the DNA
cases. Nonetheless, each of these cases represents a miscarriage of justice, at
least in the sense that the condemned individuals were legally innocent and
the government has officially acknowledged it. Moreover, in many of the
cases, the evidence of actual innocence is so compelling as to be beyond dis-
pute.
These cases, and particularly the DNA cases, open a new window of
opportunity for applying real study and knowledge to the truth-finding
mechanisms of our criminal justice system. As never before, we now have a
body of cases in which we know that the process produced the wrong result,
and we can therefore study those cases to determine what went wrong, what
did not work. All those time-honored yet ultimately faith-based assumptions
about how to conduct a fair investigation and trial can now be put to the test.
This is a window of opportunity, however, that will not remain open
forever. As DNA is used increasingly before conviction, the body of wrong-
ful convictions that can be exposed through postconviction DNA testing will
diminish, and ultimately disappear.' That is not to say that the ills that beset
the criminal justice system will be cured, but rather only that we will lose the
measuring stick for evaluating the system from the back end. DNA is no
panacea. While DNA can and will prevent the mistaken conviction of some
wrongly identified suspects, it will not prevent the errors that infect the sys-
tem in the vast majority of cases where there is no biological evidence left
behind by the perpetrator. Such biological evidence rarely exists in the ordi-
nary robbery, shooting, drug transaction, or forgery. Moreover, biological
evidence is useless where issues of consent or intent, rather than identity, are
in dispute. Only in those relatively few cases with dispositive biological evi-
dence will DNA prevent miscarriages of justice. DNA, therefore, presents
not a solution, but an opportunity and a challenge.
The opportunity poses a double imperative-a justice imperative and a
public safety imperative. Justice to the accused and victims alike demands
20. For a current count of the death row exonerations, and a description of the cases, see
Death Penalty Information Center, Innocence and the Death Penalty, at http-/www. deathpe-
naltyinfo.org/innoc.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2002).
21. Id.
22. See Michael J. Saks et al., Toward a Model Act for the Prevention and Remedy of
Erroneous Convictions, 35 NEw ENG. L. REv. 669, 670 (2001) ("In cases where DNA typing
can be performed it will routinely be performed, and the post-conviction DNA exoneration
cases that today are almost commonplace will disappear.... However, the opportunity to see
basic flaws in the criminal justice process will disappear, and the flaws themselves will re-
main.").
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that every reasonable measure be taken to ensure that no innocent person is
wrongly convicted. By the same token, public safety demands such truth-
finding accuracy, for when we convict an innocent person, the true perpetra-
tor usually goes unpunished, free to commit other crimes that might have
been prevented had the system not misfired. The cases are replete in which
the wrongful conviction of an innocent person meant that the real guilty per-
son remained free, continuing to commit other serious crimes that might
have been avoided if the mistake had not been made. As Daniel Givelber has
put it:
The costs of these erroneous convictions extend beyond the enormous
price to defendants. Victims and their families also pay a significant price.
Persuaded that the person convicted is the perpetrator, victims frequently
experience a subsequent exoneration as a fresh injury, if not the reawaken-
ing of an old wound. Moreover, victims are confronted with the terrible
realization that if the person who was convicted is not guilty, then the true
perpetrator remains at large. In addition to these intense personal costs,
there is a broader social cost: convicting the innocent person means that a
guilty person remains free.3
Correcting the criminal justice system is not a defense cause, but a sys-
tem-wide, even community-wide cause. The goal is not just to acquit the in-
nocent, but also to identify and convict the guilty. All have a stake in this en-
terprise.
But there is no mechanism at present in most jurisdictions for undertak-
ing this analysis of the system, or even for taking a hard look at any particu-
lar wrongful conviction to determine what might have gone wrong. In this
regard, the criminal justice system stands almost alone. As Barry Scheck,
Peter Neufeld, and Jim Dwyer have written in their book, Actual Innocence,
In the United States, there are grave consequences when an airplane falls
from the sky; an automobile has a defective part; a patient is the victim of
malpractice, a bad drug, or an erroneous lab report. Serious inquires are
made: What went wrong? Was it systemic breakdown? An individual's
23. Givelber, supra note 6, at 1394 (footnote omitted). The Christopher Ochoa case is a
point in case. Ochoa and his co-defendant, Richard Danziger, spent twelve years in prison for
the rape and murder of a young woman, Nancy DePriest. In 2000, DNA proved that neither
man had anything to do with the crime and that another man, Achim Josef Marino, was the
actual perpetrator. Because police coerced a false confession from Ochoa, and accordingly
failed to investigate adequately other suspects, the real suspect remained free in the commu-
nity, where he committed other serious rapes and robberies that eventually landed him in
prison for life. During the twelve years that Ochoa and Danziger sat in prison for this crime,
the victim's mother, Jeanette Popp, suffered immeasurably and unnecessarily, both from the
simple deception about who had killed her daughter and, even more profoundly, because part
of that deception included painful exaggerations she was led to believe about brutality and
suffering her daughter purportedly endured before she was killed that were written into the
false confession that Ochoa was coerced to sign. Jeanette Popp, lecture at the University of
Wisconsin Law School, March 1, 2001. See also Findley & Pray, supra note 8. at 334.
[Vol. 38
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mistake? Was there official misconduct? Can anything be done to correct
the problem and prevent it from happening againP4
But not so for the criminal justice system. "Only the criminal justice
system exempts itself from self-examination. Wrongful convictions are seen
not as catastrophes but topics to be avoided."' Although a wrongful convic-
tion and lengthy prison sentence, or worse, a death sentence, is a human ca-
tastrophe of almost unparalleled proportion, ordinarily no inquiry is made
into the causes of the error. Often, the order setting aside the conviction is a
one-line order entered in the trial court. 6 Occasionally, an appellate decision
addresses the errors in the case." But almost never is there a searching in-
quiry to determine what led to the errors, and how they can be prevented in
the future.
The growing body of actual innocence cases presents an opportunity to
change that. This article outlines a few of the models that are available for
studying and reforming the criminal justice system, starting first with the
Canadian inquiry commissions, then addressing the British Criminal Cases
Review Commission, then turning to American models, including state blue-
ribbon study panels and a law school study project, and finally proposing a
hybrid approach. Each jurisdiction differs; no one model fits all. The impor-
tant point is to find a way to learn from the wrongful conviction cases, and to
do so in a manner that might realistically lead to reform of the criminal jus-
tice system, before the opportunity is lost.
II. SCOPE OF THE INQUIRY
Before proceeding to examine the various models that might be em-
ployed to study the errors in the system, a word is in order about the scope of
the inquiry. Initial evaluation of the first DNA exoneration cases has identi-
fied recurring factors that have contributed to the wrongful convictions. The
first study of the DNA exoneration cases, conducted by the National Institute
of Justice, evaluated twenty-eight cases in which DNA proved that an inno-
cent person had been convicted and found that eyewitness identification er-
ror played a role in almost all of the studied cases.' Other features of those
twenty-eight wrongful convictions included reliance on apparently erroneous
or misleading forensic evidence, and alleged government malfeasance or
misconduct, including perjured testimony at trial, intentional withholding
from the defense of exculpatory evidence, and intentionally erroneous labo-
24. BARRY ScHEcK, PETER NEUFELD & JIM DwyER, ACTUAL LNNocENcE: FIVE DAYS TO
EXECUTION AND OTiER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 246 (2000).
25. Id.
26. Givelber, supra note 6, at 1323-24 n.19; Samuel R. Gross, Loss of Innocence: Eye-
witness Identification and Proof of Guilt, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 395. 410 (1987).
27. E.g., State v. Hicks, 549 N.W.2d 435 (Wis. 1996).
28. CONNORS ET AL., supra note 8, at 15.
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ratory tests and expert testimony." Scheck, Neufeld, and Dwyer subse-
quently analyzed sixty-two DNA-based exonerations in the United States
and concluded that mistaken eyewitness identification was a factor in eighty-
four percent of the cases; jailhouse snitches or informants played a role in
twenty-one percent; false confessions were present in twenty-four percent;
inadequate representation by defense counsel in twenty-seven percent;
prosecutorial misconduct in forty-two percent; and police misconduct in fifty
percent." Professor Saks and his students thereafter updated that study to in-
clude eighty-one DNA exoneration cases." They concluded, again, that mis-
taken eyewitness identification was the leading contributing factor, present
in sixty of the eighty-one cases. 2 Additionally, they found that erroneous fo-
rensic science was present in fifty-three of the eighty-one cases; prosecuto-
rial misconduct in thirty-two; police misconduct in twenty-six; fraudulent or
tainted evidence in twenty-five; bad lawyering in twenty-three; false confes-
sions in fifteen; reliance on snitch or informant testimony in fourteen; and
false witness testimony in fourteen." Other analysts have argued that in the
capital cases perjury is the most common and direct cause of error."
The nature of these errors defines the necessary nature and scope of the
inquiry into the flaws that produce wrongful convictions, and the possible
remedies. The errors derive not just from what happens in the courtroom, but
from every step in the process-from the initial gathering of evidence, inter-
viewing of witnesses, and identification of suspects; to the decisions about
whom to investigate, what science and experts to utilize, what evidence the
state must or should disclose to the defense; to the rules governing admissi-
bility of evidence, such as expert testimony on eyewitness identification and
the testimony of jailhouse informants; to the instructions given to the jury on
these matters; to the nature of and applicable standards for appellate review
and the availability of postconviction remedies. The inquiry is, therefore,
one that cannot be undertaken just by gathering lawyers together to think
about the rules that govern trials; a holistic evaluation of the process from
start to finish is required, with input from experts and stakeholders involved
at every step in the process. And the inquiry of necessity requires evaluation
not only of what contributes to wrongful convictions, but also how that prob-
lem leads in turn to the failure to identify and convict the guilty.
Much study has already begun into many of these problems. Notably,
for example, the National Institute of Justice Technical Working Group for
Eyewitness Evidence has drawn on the considerable body of psychological
study on eyewitness identifications to produce an important report and set of
29. Id.
30. SCHECK ET AL., supra note 24, at 246.
31. Saks et al., supra note 22, at 671.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Steven Clark, Procedural Reforms in Capital Cases Applied to Perjury, 34 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 453,453 (2001).
[Vol. 38
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recommendations on procedures for minimizing the risks of eyewitness
identification error.' New Jersey Attorney General John J. Farmer, Jr., tak-
ing the process a step further, has mandated those guides, plus additional
safeguards recommended by experts in the field, for law enforcement in that
state. 6 Study is also underway and recommendations for reform are being
made to some degree in all of the other identified causes of wrongful convic-
tions.37 Learning and change are possible.
That is not to say, however, that the need to study the wrongful convic-
tions is already being met. Such study is producing and will continue to pro-
duce a significant volume of information in the legal and scientific literature.
But it will not by itself apply that knowledge to local circumstances, identify
all of the error points in a given criminal justice system, translate neatly into
reforms applicable in a particular jurisdiction, or respond to local political
realities in a way that is likely to lead to reform. More systematic, localized
inquiries, by respected and authoritative bodies, are necessary to create the
possibility of real, meaningful reform based on the lessons of the false con-
victions. Fortunately, several models for such inquiry exist.
35. NATIONAL INsTITUTE OF JusTicE, EYEwmTEss EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT (1999). See also Donald P. Judges, Two Cheers for the Department of Justice's
Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement. 53 ARK. L. REv. 231 (2000).
36. See John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, Attorney General Guide-
lines for Preparing and Conducting Photo and Live Lineup Identification Procedures (Apr.
18, 2001) (on file with the author); Witnesses, Victims Get New Way to ID Suspects. BERGEN
COUNTY REcoRD (July 22, 2001), available at 2001 WL 5261060. Among other things, the
new regulations require that photographs or suspects be presented to witnesses sequentially,
rather than simultaneously, because research shows that this simple change in procedure re-
duces eyewitness error rates from somewhere between twenty and forty percent to about ten
percent. Id.
37. See, e.g., Leo & Ofshe, supra note 14; Richard A. Leo, False Confessions: Causes,
Consequences, and Solutions, forthcoming in WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON
FAILED JUSTICE (Saundra D. Westervelt & John A. Humphrey. eds., Rutgers University Press
2001); Gail Johnson, False Confessions and Fundamental Fairness: The Need for Electronic
Recording of Custodial Interrogations, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 719 (1997); Steven A. Drizin &
Beth A. Colgan, Let the Cameras Roll: Mandatory Videotaping of Interrogations Is the Solu-
tion to Illinois' Problem of False Confessions, 32 Loy. U. CI. L.J. 337 (2001); Ellen
Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling and Em-
bellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 917 (1999); Sharone Levy. Righting Illinois' Wrongs: Sug-
gestions for Reform and a Callfor Abolition, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 469 (2001); Clark. su-
pra note 34; Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law's Formative
Encounters with Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS LJ. 1069 (1998); Michael J.
Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, What DNA "Fingerprinting " Can Teach the Law About the Rest
of Forensic Science, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 361 (1991); George Castelle, Lab Fraud: Lessons
Learned, THE CHAMPION 12 (May 1999); Scott Bales, Turning the Microscope Back on Fo-
rensic Scientists, 26 No. 2 LrnIG. 51 (2000); U.S. DEFT. OF JusIc, OFFIcE OF JusTIcE
PROGRAMs, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JusTicE A REPORT FROM TIE NATIONAL CONmuisSION ON
THE FUTURE OF DNA EvIDENCE, POSTCONVICTION DNA TESTNG: RECO.MMENDATIONS FOR
HANDLING REQUES (1999), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/177626.
htm.
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III. THE MODELS
A. Canadian Wrongful Conviction Inquiries
Canada has not avoided the problem of wrongful convictions. But Can-
ada's response has been far different than the response in the United States.
In Canada, significant exonerations have not been followed by the official
silence that has greeted most American exonerations. In Canada, the gov-
ernment has taken the mistakes seriously, viewed them as necessarily the
product of a flawed system rather than insignificant aberrations, and has
made a serious effort to remedy the problems.
One of the more notable of these cases arose from the wrongful convic-
tion of Guy Paul Morin for the 1984 murder of nine-year-old Christine Jes-
sop. 8 Morin was first acquitted, the judgment was reversed on appeal and he
was then convicted following the second trial (double jeopardy does not bar
appeal and retrial after an acquittal in Canada39), and ultimately in 1995 he
was exonerated when DNA proved he could not have committed the crime."0
Following the exoneration, the Province of Ontario ordered "an unprece-
dented top-to-bottom examination of its criminal justice system."'" The Lieu-
tenant Governor in Council in 1996 directed that a public inquiry be held,
and appointed a Commission on the Proceedings Involving Guy Paul Morin.
The Commission, headed by a former judge of the Quebec Court of Appeal,
was charged to (a) determine why the case resulted in conviction of an inno-
cent person; (b) make recommendations for change intended to prevent fu-
ture miscarriages of justice; and (c) educate the community about the ad-
ministration of justice generally and the criminal proceedings against Guy
Paul Morin in particular."2
The Commission held 146 days of hearings, heard testimony from 120
witnesses, reviewed transcripts, exhibits, and other documents, and produced
a two-volume, 1400-page report, complete with 119 specific recommenda-
tions for improving the criminal justice system."3 Those recommendations
addressed problems with forensic science, the use of informant testimony,
police investigation procedures, the performance and training of prosecutors
and defense counsel, the instructions given the jury at trial, and the rules
governing postconviction and appellate review.' The conclusions were di-
38. See Jack King, The Ordeal of Guy Paul Morin: Canada Copes with Systemic Injus-
tice, THE CHAMPION (Aug. 1998), available at http://www.crimirnajustice.org
/CHAMPION/ARTICLES/98augO 1.htm.
39. Id. at *6.
40. Id. at *1.
41. ld. at* 1.
42. FRED KAUFMAN, EXEcUTIVE SUMMARY: COMMISSION ON PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING
Guy PAUL MORIN (1998), available at http://www.attomeygencral.jus.gov.on.ca/html/
MORIN/exesumrec/morinesumm.pdf.
43. Id.
44. Id., Recommendations at 1-40.
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rect and damning. Regarding the use of jailhouse informants, for example,
the Commission concluded:
[The informants') claim that Guy Paul Morin confessed to [them) was
easy to make and difficult to disprove. These facts, taken together, were a
ready recipe for disaster. The systemic evidence emanating from Canada,
Great Britain, Australia and the United States demonstrated that the dan-
gers associated with the jailhouse informants were not unique to the Morin
case. Indeed, a number of miscarriages of justice throughout the world are
likely explained, at least in part, by the false, self-serving evidence given
by such informants. 5
Specific recommendations followed for limiting the use of informants,
including requirements for screening and obtaining authorization by superi-
ors before a prosecutor can use an informant, limiting the types of induce-
ments that can be offered to informants, ensuring openness and full disclo-
sure to the defense of the informant's background and the nature of any
deals, and instructing juries on the unreliability of informant testimony.' The
Commission made similar specific recommendations for each of the other
problem areas identified in the inquiry.
In the process, the Commission noted the imperative for reform both for
the wrongly convicted, and for the victims of crimes and the community.
The Commission observed:
The criminal proceedings against Guy Paul Morin represent a tragedy not
only for Mr. Morin and his family, but also for the community at large: the
system failed him-a system for which we, the community, must bear re-
sponsibility. An innocent man was arrested, stigmatized, imprisoned and
convicted. The real killer has never been found. The trail grows colder
with each passing year. For Christine Jessop's family there is no closure."
Judge Kaufman concluded the report, writing: "The challenge for all
participants in the administration of justice in Ontario will be to draw upon
this experience and learn from it."
The inquiry into the case of Guy Paul Morin does not stand in isolation
in Canada. In 1998, the Manitoba government ordered a similar inquiry into
the wrongful conviction of Thomas Sophonow.4' After three trials,
Sophonow was convicted of the 1981 strangulation murder in Winnipeg of a
sixteen-year-old girl, Barbara Stoppel. In 1985, the Manitoba Court of Ap-
45. Id., Executive at 14.
46. Id., Recommendations at 11-23.
47. FRED KAuRFAN, ExEcuTvE SUMMARY: COMMISSION ON PROCEEDLNGS LNVOLVLNG
GUY PAUL MoRiN (1998), available at http://www.attomeygencral.jus.gov.on.ca/html/
MORIN/Kaufmanrpt/morinchl.pdf at 1.
48. Id. at http://www.attomeygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/html/MORINlcxesumrcclmorinconcl
.pdf at 2.
49. See The Inquiry Regarding Thomas Sophonow, available at http://www.gov.mb.ca/
justicelsophonow/mdex.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2002).
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peal acquitted him." For the next thirteen years he continued to seek full ex-
oneration. Finally, in 1998, the Winnipeg Police Service reopened the case.
On June 8, 2000, the Police Service announced that Sophonow was in fact
innocent, and that another suspect had been identified." The Manitoba gov-
ernment publicly apologized to Sophonow and announced that there would
be a Commission of Inquiry "to review the police investigations and full
court proceedings to determine if mistakes were made" and "to determine
whether compensation should be provided." ' As in the Morin case, the
Sophonow Commission undertook a searching inquiry, and produced an ex-
haustive written report, detailing the errors that led to the wrongful convic-
tion, and making recommendations for reform of the system. The Commis-
sion's report included recommendations for rules requiring the videotaping
of all police interrogations of suspects to guard against coerced or disputed
confessions," recommendations for improved eyewitness identification pro-
cedures along with jury instructions on the frailty of eyewitness identifica-
tion evidence,' and severe restrictions on the use of jailhouse informants."
Another such inquiry was also held in the case of David Marshall, Jr., who
was wrongfully convicted of a 1971 murder, 6 and another is presently under
way in the case of Greg Parsons, a Newfoundland bodybuilder who was ex-
onerated by DNA evidence after being wrongfully convicted of killing his
mother. 7
B. The British Criminal Cases Review Commission
Great Britain offers an alternate approach to wrongful conviction-a
formal governmental body charged with investigating potential miscarriages
of justice before innocence is otherwise established. In 1997, Great Britain
created the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC), an independent
body responsible for investigating suspected miscarriages of criminal justice
in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. 8 The CCRC has authority to re-
view and independently investigate claims and then to refer the cases to the
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at http://www.gov.mb.ca/justice/sophonow/intro/thefacts.html.
53. Id. at http://www.gov.mb.caljustice/sophonow/police/recommend.html.
54. Id. at http://www.gov.mb.ca/justice/sophonow/eyewitness/recommend.html.
55. Id. at http://www.gov.mb.ca/justice/sophonow/ailhouse/recommend.html.
56. See http://www.indigenousbar.ca/cases/marshallinq.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2002).
57. Allison Lawlor, Newfoundland Gives $650,000 to Wrongfully Convicted Man, TilE
GLOBE AND MAIL, (Feb. 28, 2002), available at http://www.globeandmaiI.com/scrvlet/
RTGAMArticleHTMLTemplate/C/20020228/wconv2802?hub=homeBN&tf=tgam%252
Frealtime%252Ffullstory.html&cf=tgam/realtime/configneutral&vg= BigAdVariableGencra-
tor&slug=wconv2802&date=20020228&archive=RTGAM&site=Front&ad-page-namc=brca
kingnews.
58. Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, ch. 35 §§ 8-25 (Eng.). See also David Horan, The Inno-
cence Commission: An Independent Review Board for Wrongful Convictions, 20 N. ILL. U.L.
REV. 91 (2000).
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appropriate court of appeal or to the Home Secretary with a recommendation
for a Royal Pardon. The CCRC is mandated to refer cases for appellate re-
view where there is a "'real possibility that the conviction, verdict, finding or
sentence would not be upheld were the reference to be made."'" The court of
appeal has described this "real possibility" test as requiring a referral when
there is "'more than an outside chance or a bare possibility, but which may
be less than a probability or a likelihood or a racing certainty' that the con-
viction will be found 'unsafe, '
In its first three years, from 1997 through the Fall of 2000, the CCRC
received 3,680 applications for review from convicted persons. As of Octo-
ber 31, 2000, the CCRC had reviewed 2,381 of those applications. Of those
cases, 203, or 4.3 percent, were referred for appellate review. As of that date,
forty-nine of those appeals had been heard, and the court had quashed the
conviction in thirty-eight of the reviewed cases.6' The CCRC now receives
approximately 860 cases each year, 500 of which it deems eligible for re-
view.' Of those, approximately thirty-five are referred to the Court of Ap-
peal. In sixty-eight percent of the referred cases, the convictions are quashed;
in eighty percent, the sentences are quashed.'
The British and American criminal justice systems are of course not
identical,' which raises questions about whether a commission of this type is
necessary or workable in the United States.' Among the more notable dif-
ferences is that, unlike the U.S. system, the British system provides only lim-
ited direct appellate review of criminal convictions, and no mechanism for
collateral attack.' The Criminal Cases Review Commission is especially im-
portant in Great Britain to provide a mechanism for postconviction review
that otherwise is largely nonexistent.
But in most relevant respects the British and American criminal justice
systems are quite similar.' Accordingly, commentators including Norval
Morris, Barry Scheck, David Horan, and Lissa Griffin, among others, have
called for creating similar Inspector General-type bodies, or ombudsmen, or
Innocence Commissions, to review potential cases of wrongful conviction in
59. Lissa Griffin, The Correction of Wrongful Convictions: A Comparative Perspective,
16 AM. U. INT'L L. Rv. 1241, 1276 (2001) (quoting Criminal Appeal Act, 1995. § 13(l)(a)
(Eng.)).
60. Griffin, supra note 59, at 1277 (quoting R. v. CCRC, ex p. Pearson, 3 All E.R. 498
(1999)). Under British law, a conviction is deemed "unsafe," and hence reversible, if there is
a "lurking doubt" or if the jury would "necessarily have reached the same result in light of the
evidence." Griffin, supra note 59, at 1305.
61. Griffin, supra note 59, at 1277.
62. Leonard Leigh, Commissioner, Criminal Cases Review Commission. "Innocence
Projects and Commissions: Who Will Free the Wrongfully Convicted?", presentation at Har-
vard Law School Conference, Wrongful Convictions: A Call to Action (Apr. 20, 2002).
63. Id.
64. See Horan, supra note 58, at 100-05; Griffin, supra note 59, at 1243-46.
65. Horan, supra note 58, at 100-25.
66. Griffin, supra note 59, at 1246.
67. Horan, supra note 58, at 100; Griffin, supra note 59, at 1244.
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the U.S. 8 These commentators reason that the basic criminal procedural sys-
tems in the Great Britain and the United States are substantially the same. '
And while there are notable differences, particularly in appellate and post-
conviction procedures, those differences are not as significant as they first
appear. Although the U.S. system generally provides a right to direct review
and collateral attack, the scope of such review is limited to correcting legal
and procedural errors, not re-evaluating guilt or innocence."' Appellate courts
cannot hear new evidence, and frequently invoke doctrines such as waiver
and harmless error to avoid reversals even where procedural error exists. As
one commentator has noted, "[flactual claims of innocence tend to get little
hearing in American appellate courts, particularly in post-conviction pro-
ceedings following direct appeals where courts have set very high thresholds
for the consideration of such claims."7 By contrast, in Great Britain, while
there is a more limited opportunity for direct appellate review and no avenue
for collateral attack, the appellate court "has broad jurisdiction to hear new
evidence and employs a relatively relaxed standard for overturning a wrong-
ful conviction. 72
Moreover, strict time limitations and high burdens of proof in the
American postconviction system are designed to make it difficult to obtain
postconviction relief. Most states impose onerous time limitations on post-
conviction motions, even when they are based on newly discovered evi-
dence, often barring such motions unless brought within a year or two, or
even as little as twenty-one days, after conviction." Under the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, most federal habeas corpus peti-
tions now face a strict one-year statute of limitations, and the substantive
standards for relief have tightened so strictly as to make habeas relief un-
available in all but the most egregious cases of constitutional error. Corn-
68. Horan, supra note 58, at 97-98; Griffin, supra note 59, at 1243-46; see also MARTIN
YANT, PRESUMED GUILTY: WHEN INNOCENT PEOPLE ARE WRONGLY CONVICTED 221 (199 1).
69. Horan, supra note 58, at 102.
70. See Griffin, supra note 59, at 1246; Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) (inno-
cence is not a free-standing basis upon which a federal court generally may grant habeas cor-
pus relief).
71. Horan, supra note 58, at 106.
72. Griffin, supra note 59, at 1246. Among other grounds, British appellate courts may
reverse when they determine a conviction is "unsafe," which can turn on whether there exists
a "lurking doubt" or whether the jury would "necessarily have reached the same result in light
of the evidence." Id. at 1305.
73. See Patrick Leahy, The Innocence Protection Act of 2001, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1113.
1124 (2001). Virginia has the most restrictive time limitation-21 days after trial. VA. SUP.
CT. R. 3A:15(c) (2001). In light of significant recent criticism, the Virginia legislature has
created a new writ of actual innocence, effective November 15, 2002, that is not subject to
that rule, and that is available in felony cases. 2001 Va. Acts ch. 873, S.B. 1366 (codified as
amended at § 19.2-327.2 (Cum. Supp. 2001)).
74. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2002)
75. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2001). For criticism of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act, particularly as applied to claims of innocence, see Kenneth Williams, The
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act: What's Wrong With It and [low To Fix It. 33
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pounding these difficulties, there is generally no right to counsel in postcon-
viction proceedings and collateral attacks, so simply accessing the system to
make a claim of innocence can be an insurmountable hurdle to many indi-
gent and untrained defendants.""
Recently, many American jurisdictions have relaxed some of the restric-
tions on innocence claims, at least in cases when DNA testing is available.
Twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia now have statutes that au-
thorize postconviction DNA testing and provide a right to relief upon favor-
able testing; most eliminate or expand the statute of limitations in DNA
cases that otherwise applies to new trial motions." Similar federal legislation
is also pending." But these new laws almost uniformly apply only to that
rare species of case in which DNA evidence that was not available previ-
ously can be used to prove innocence. For the vast majority of cases in
which new evidence might point toward innocence, all of the otherwise in-
creasingly onerous barriers to postconviction relief remain. American appel-
late and postconviction remedies hardly substitute fully for a commission,
such as the CCRC, with full funding and power to make the necessary in-
quiries into potential wrongful convictions.
As Lissa Griffin has proposed, the United States could remedy the defi-
ciencies in the appellate and postconviction systems by creating
an independent governmental entity modeled after the English CCRC.
Such a body would have the power to entertain claims of factual inno-
cence, as opposed to claims of error or misconduct. In addition, such a
body would have full investigative powers, including subpoena power and
the ability to examine police and prosecution files. After investigation,
such a body would be authorized to refer any cases in which substantial
new evidence has been found to an appropriate trial-level court.7
As is obvious from this discussion, a commission of this type does not
directly address the need identified in this article to study and learn from the
wrongful conviction cases to prevent future miscarriages of justice. A com-
mission like the CCRC more directly seeks to identify and remedy individ-
ual injustices than recommend systemic reforms. But, beyond patching a
CONN. L. Rnv. 919 (2001).
76. Even on direct appeal, where there generally is a right to counsel, appointed appellate
counsel is often woefully inadequate. See Margaret H. Lemos, Civil Challenges to the Use of
Low-Bid Contracts for Indigent Defense, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1808. 1832 n.136 (2000)
(collecting cases in which heavy caseloads among counsel for indigent appellants resulted in
ineffective assistance of counsel); Douglas E. Cressler, Mandated Briefing: A Judicial
Mechanism for Enforcing Quality Control in Criminal Appeals, 44 REs GEsTAE 20 (July
2000) (identifying inadequacies in appellate representation in criminal cases in Indiana);
Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for
the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALEL.J. 1835, 1843 (1994).
77. See generally Kathy Swedlow, Don't Believe Everything You Read: A Review of
Modem "Post-Conviction" DNA Testing Statutes, 38 CAL W. L. REv. 355 (2002).
78. See Leahy, supra note 73.
79. Griffin, supra note 59, at 1302 (footnotes omitted).
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hole in the innocence safety net, the nature of such a commission's work,
and the high-profile and credibility of such a commission, no doubt would
also help in the systemic reform enterprise, as it would continue to highlight
patterns in wrongful conviction cases, draw attention to those issues, and
perhaps create a climate of enhanced receptiveness to reform. Indeed, such a
commission could also be specifically charged to monitor the errors it de-
tects in the system, and to issue reports with recommendations for reform.
But such a commission is indeed a tall order in the existing political and
legal culture in the United States. It may just be that such a shift from the
pure adversarial process that defines the American system, to something like
the CCRC, with its inquisitorial powers, is too much to expect. It may be
that, "[i]n the end, we prefer the autonomy, discretion, and theater which
characterizes the adversarial process to the regulation and bureaucracy in-
herent in any effort to make the search for truth the principle goal of the
criminal process."8 But if it can work in Great Britain, it might also work
here. We need not wait for that day, however, to start learning from the
wrongful convictions. Other options are more immediately available in the
interim.
C. American Study Commissions
Studying the flaws in the criminal justice system is hardly a radical no-
tion. Indeed, although the United States has not yet seen fit to make expan-
sive inquiries into individual cases of wrongful conviction, as in Canada, or
to more systematically scour the landscape for individual injustices as does
the CCRC in Great Britain, there are emerging efforts here to study the ap-
parent flaws in the system. That effort has begun in capital cases, which cer-
tainly can serve as a model for the more expansive analysis proposed here.
1. Capital Punishment Study Commissions
The alarming number of wrongful convictions in capital cases in the
United States has led to the formation of study committees or commissions
in a number of states, whose assignment is to study the effectiveness of the
criminal justice system in capital cases, and make recommendations for re-
forms. The capital cases have received considerable attention, obviously be-
cause the consequences of a wrongful conviction are so horrifying, but also
because they form an identifiable body of cases that upon examination have
produced many verifiable wrongful convictions. But there is no reason to be-
lieve that the problem of wrongful convictions is limited to capital cases, and
no reason to limit study of wrongful convictions to such cases.
Illinois has led the way in creating a death penalty study commission.
After Governor George Ryan declared a moratorium on the death penalty on
80. Givelber, supra note 6, at 1396.
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January 31, 2000,81 he appointed a blue-ribbon panel to study the death pen-
alty and make recommendations to correct its failings. Frank McGarr, a for-
mer federal judge, chairs the Commission and its fourteen members include
prosecutors, defense attorneys, former U.S. Senator Paul Simon, novelist
Scott Turow, the chief of staff to the Chicago police superintendent, and the
president of a janitorial firm.' The Governor set no specific mandates as to
how the Commission is to do its work, or when it was to complete the job."
The Commission reviewed all Illinois death penalty cases in the twenty-four
years since the Illinois General Assembly reinstated capital punishment, pay-
ing particular attention to the thirteen cases in which individuals sentenced
to death in Illinois were exonerated.' The Commission took testimony from
experts and held a series of public hearings."
In April 2002, the Illinois Commission issued its report, after two years
of study. The lengthy report makes eighty-five specific recommendations
for reforms, including recommendations to require videotaping of interroga-
tions in capital cases; to review police procedures for obtaining eyewitness
identifications; to reduce the number of circumstances under which the death
penalty may be imposed; to increase the funding and training for lawyers
and judges involved in capital cases; to intensify the scrutiny of the testi-
mony of in-custody informants; and to implement new procedures for review
of capital sentences. 6
Other states are making similar inquiries. In Indiana, Governor Frank
O'Bannon asked the Criminal Law Study Commission to take a comprehen-
sive look at how that state's death penalty law is applied and whether there
are adequate safeguards to protect the innocent." In Arizona, at the request
of the Governor, Attorney General Janet Napolitano in July 2000 named
more than twenty people to a commission to study whether the death penalty
is fairly applied in that state."8 Among its tasks, the Capital Case Commis-
81. Governor Ryan, a death penalty proponent, declared the moratorium in reaction to
the significant number of wrongful convictions in capital cases in his state. Thirteen death
row inmates were exonerated and released during the same time period in which the state had
carried out twelve executions. See Levy, supra note 37, at 471; Clark, supra note 34, at 453.
82. Steve Mills & Ken Armstrong, Ryan Sets up Panel to Study Death Penalty, CHI.
TRIB., Mar. 9,2000, available at 2000 WL 3643904.
83. Paul Krawzak, Panel to Look at Flaws in Execution System, SPRINGFIELD ST. J.-REG..
Mar. 10, 2000, available at 2000 WL 22767056.
84. Report of the Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment, George H. Ryan.
Governor, at i (Apr. 2002), available at http://justice.policy.net/cjreform/studiesl ilryan-
comlindexilrpt.vtm [hereinafter Governor's Commission].
85. Editorial, Time Running out for Reform, CHI. TRiB., Oct. 21, 2001, available at 2001
WL 4127710.
86. Governor's Commission, supra note 84, at i-ii.
87. Lesley Stedman, State Study Won't Look at Ending Executions, Indiana Committee
to Review Fairness of Death Penalty, THE Louisvnue. COUtER-JOUIAt., June 18. 2000,
available at 2000 WL 7033670.
88. Mike McCloy, Death Penalty to get "Fresh Look" by Panel, ARtZ. REPuBUC, July
22, 2000, available at 2000 WL 8051727.
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sion is to examine how thoroughly claims of innocence are investigated. The
Commission is comprised of judges, prosecution and defense attorneys, a
mental health advocate, victims' rights representatives, and state legisla-
tors. 9 Nebraska, Virginia and North Carolina, among others, are also study-
ing their death penalty systems.'
2. Academic Study Projects
Those interested in seizing the learning opportunity presented by the
DNA cases need not await official government action to begin the process.
The Constitution Project at Georgetown University, for example, has assem-
bled a committee of thirty former judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys,
journalists, scholars, and others to study and recommend reforms to the
death penalty system." In its initial draft report, the Project proposed eight-
een reforms of the capital punishment system, addressing issues such as the
provision of adequate counsel, the scope of the death penalty, reducing racial
disparity, protecting against wrongful conviction and sentencing, and in-
creasing discovery in capital cases.'
Another such effort, more broadly addressing itself to reforming the
criminal justice system, has been initiated by a group of law students at Ari-
zona State University.93 Those students, participating in a seminar taught by
Professor Michael Saks, have set out to use the DNA exonerations "to iden-
tify the systemic flaws in the criminal justice system that produce errors and
work to cure those flaws."9 ' Their goal is to produce a "Model Act embody-
ing a comprehensive set of criminal justice system reforms," all aimed at re-
ducing "the probability of an erroneous conviction, without reducing the
probability of a correct conviction."95 Their Model Act will address eyewit-
ness identification procedures (both interviewing of witnesses and conduct-
ing lineups and photo spreads); interrogation of suspects; forensic science;
indigent legal representation; prosecutorial misconduct; postconviction pro-
cedures; and post-release rights.96 Unlike the death penalty study commis-
sions, their mission is not limited to examining the capital punishment sys-
tem, but more broadly extends to examining the criminal justice system as a
whole, in light of the wrongful conviction cases.
89. Office of the Attorney General, State of Arizona, Capital Case Commission Interim
Report, available at http://justice.policy.net/relatives/19100.pdf at I.
90. Governor's Commission, supra note 84, at 15.
91. The Constitution Project, Mandatory Justice: Eighteen Reforms to the Death Penalty
(Pre-Publication Draft, July 27, 2001), available at http://justice.policy.net/ rcla-
tives/18680.pdf.
92. Id.
93. See generally Saks et al., supra note 22.
94. Id. at 670.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 672-82.
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While such efforts can be important parts of the reform effort, and can
provide useful material for other study and reform commissions, alone they
cannot carry the weight of the reform movement. They can generate infor-
mation and ideas, but without official sanction or involvement of players
with a direct stake in the system, or without specific application to a particu-
lar jurisdiction, they are unlikely alone to translate directly into reform.
3. Expanding the Inquiry: State and Federal Criminal Justice Study
Commissions
State and federal study commissions are needed to ensure that the re-
form opportunity is not lost. The commissions can, as in Canada, be ap-
pointed after significant exonerations to scrutinize the failings that produced
each particular miscarriage of justice. But states need not await such a high-
profile exoneration within their borders to begin the study. Nor need they
muster the fortitude to engage in the type of painful (and expensive) individ-
ual-case self-scrutiny the Canadians have undertaken in the Morin and
Sophonow inquiries. Every jurisdiction can and should now form study
commissions, like the death penalty study commissions in Illinois and else-
where that are studying on a more limited basis the flaws in the capital pun-
ishment system. Like the Arizona law students drafting a Model Act, they
can take as their charge to study the entire criminal justice system, from top
to bottom, drawing on the lessons from wrongful conviction cases within
and outside their borders, and then to apply the lessons learned to the spe-
cific circumstances and conditions within their jurisdiction.
Generating the concern and political will to undertake such an in-depth
inquiry is certainly made easier after a local high-profile DNA exoneration.
But even without such a case, states can and should move forward with
study of the wrongful conviction cases. After all, many of the factors that
contribute to wrongful convictions cross all state borders. Eyewitnesses suf-
fer the same weaknesses in every state. Police run the risk of tainting eye-
witness identifications wherever they conduct lineups and photo spreads. Po-
lice interrogate suspects in largely the same way in most jurisdictions. Police
and prosecutors everywhere work under the same pressures that lead to con-
cealing exculpatory evidence. Providing adequate counsel for the indigent
poses challenges in every jurisdiction. No matter where a DNA exoneration
occurs, it provides useful material for study in virtually every jurisdiction.
No state is immune from the problem of wrongful convictions and its
converse, failing to identify and convict the guilty. At least twenty-seven
states and the District of Columbia presently have at least one case in which
a wrongly convicted person has been exonerated by DNA testing. 9 Those
97. Those jurisdictions include Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida.
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts. Maryland,
Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma. Ohio. Pennsylvania.
South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, Washington D.C., West Virginia, and Wisconsin. For a cur-
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cases each present a powerful argument for examining the systems that pro-
duced those errors.
Even exonerations in nearby states, or exonerations merely with connec-
tions to a state, can generate the interest and concern necessary to motivate
an examination of the criminal justice system. In Wisconsin, for example,
interest in creating a study commission arose from a Texas exoneration-the
case of Christopher Ochoa-because law students at the University of Wis-
consin Law School's Innocence Project worked to free Ochoa.9" Ochoa
served twelve years in prison after falsely confessing under police coercion
to a rape and murder he did not commit. In 2001, Ochoa and his co-
defendant were released from prison after DNA proved that they could not
have committed the crime, and that another man, who had subsequently con-
fessed, was indeed the perpetrator. The Wisconsin students' involvement in
the case generated considerable publicity in Wisconsin, and consequently,
considerable attention to the problem of wrongful convictions."
With the attention focused on the problem by the DNA exonerations,
other types of wrongful conviction take on new significance and can also
serve as part of the impetus for self-examination. Every state has miscar-
riages of justice even apart from the DNA cases. Every state has wrongful
convictions established by reversal and subsequent acquittal or dismissal, or
by pardon. Finding and compiling such cases, especially in the shadow of
the more than one hundred DNA exonerations nationwide, can add power-
fully to the argument for self-study.'"
Commissions or inquiries can be formed in many ways. Governors and
attorneys general can appoint panels. In some jurisdictions state supreme
courts can establish commissions pursuant to their supervisory authority
over criminal procedure. Legislative councils can also be charged to under-
take the study. Barring the present willingness or inclination of such political
entities to initiate the process, commissions can also be formed from the
rent listing of the DNA exonerations and their states, see http://www.innocence pro-
ject.org/case/display-cases.php?sort=year-exoneration&start=l&end=20 (last visited Apr. 6,
2002).
98. See, e.g., Tom Kertscher, UW Project on DNA Evidence Clears Austin Man.
MILWAUKEE JOURNAL-SENTINEL, Jan. 16, 2001, available at http://www.jsonline.com/
news/State/janOl/lochoa011601.asp; Tom Kertscher, Texas Inmate Gets Freedom Back,
MILWAUKEE JOURNAL-SENTINEL, Jan. 16, 2001, available at http://www.jsonlinc.com/
news/Metro/jan01/ochoal70I1601a.asp; Alan Berlow, Texas Justice, SALON.COM, Oct. 31.
2000, at http://www.salon.com/politics/feature/2000/10/31/ ochoa/index.html; Lisa Falken-
berg, Free Again: Law School Exonerates Man Convicted of Murder," ABCNEWS.coM, Jan.
16, 2001, at http://204.202.137.115/sections/us/DailyNews/ dnaconvict0101 16.html.
99. See sources cited in note 98, supra.
100. In Wisconsin, for example, law students searched published appellate decisions and
surveyed public defenders and private attorneys to compile a list of apparent wrongful convic-
tions beyond those involving DNA. The students were able to compile and analyze a prelimi-
nary list of 14 cases involving wrongful convictions, which added powerfully to the argument
for a commission to study the system. Jessica A. Harry et al., Guilty Until Proven Innocent: A
Study of Wrongful Convictions in the Wisconsin Criminal Justice System, unpublished manu-
script (2001) (on file with the author).
[Vol. 38
20
California Western Law Review, Vol. 38 [2001], No. 2, Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol38/iss2/2
2002] A CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMISSION TO STUDY WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 353
ground up. In Wisconsin, for example, the State Bar has taken an interest in
the issue, and is pursuing an effort to work with the deans of the state's two
law schools to appoint a broad-based study commission, with the hope that
the commission can then gain official sanction from the Supreme Court or
the legislature.
However organized, any such commission must be one that is credible,
respected, and above politics. The temptation is there to call these new
commissions "Innocence Commissions," but this title is too narrow, too
likely to marginalize the effort as a criminal defense movement when it
really is much more. Truth and accuracy in the criminal justice system mean
both acquitting the innocent and convicting the guilty. The reforms certainly
protect the innocent, but also condemn the guilty. Accordingly, a more ap-
propriate, if less inspiring moniker, might be simply a "Criminal Justice
Study Commission. '
To fulfill the objectives of any such commission, it must have members
that include prosecution and defense attorneys, members of the judiciary,
representatives of police groups, victims rights groups, academics, and, im-
portantly, non-lawyers and individuals outside the criminal justice system.
Old problems require fresh ideas and perspectives. Individuals who work in
the criminal justice system bring knowledge and expertise, but also inevita-
bly biases and a certain unavoidable inability to see new ways of doing
things. Those outside the criminal justice system can bring a fresh perspec-
tive and common sense to the problems that can contribute significantly to a
serious and searching study of the system.
CONCLUSION
The scientific certainty of the DNA exonerations presents an opportu-
nity for meaningful reform of the criminal justice system beyond anything
we have known before. The opportunity is an important one-for the
wrongly convicted or accused, for the victims who have a right to know the
truth about their perpetrators, and for the safety of the community. But it is
an opportunity that will not be fully present for long. It is an opportunity to
learn that we must not waste.
101. Quibbling over the name may seem trivial, but it has important symbolic effect.
Prosecutors and victims rights advocates, for example, are more likely to feel they have a
stake in the enterprise if the language used does not carry implicit judgments hostile to their
interest in punishing the guilty.
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